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WAR CRIMES AND THE LIMITS 
OF LEGALISM 
Gary Jonathan Bass* 
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY 
AFrER GENOCIDE AND MAss VIOLENCE. By Martha Minow. Bos­
ton: Beacon Press. 1998. Pp. xiii, 214. $23. 
MAss ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW. By Mark 
Osiel. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction. 1997. Pp. x, 317. $34.95. 
I. 
In April 1945, Sir John Simon, Britain's Lord Chancellor, drew 
up a memorandum that was the last gasp in the diplomatic struggle 
against Nuremberg. Under American pressure, and despite British 
objections, the Allies were poised to agree to put the Axis leader­
ship on trial for war crimes. In the kind of magnificent understate­
ment that the British government could sometimes inadvertently 
achieve, it was entitled "The Argument for Summary Process 
against Hitler & Co." The memorandum was a series of arguments 
to be used by the British delegation at the San Francisco conference 
in a last-ditch effort to win over the Americans and Soviets. 
Simon's case was simple: the Nazi leaders deserved to be punished, 
but trials were not the way to do that. Simon feared that a trial of 
the Nazi leadership would drag on, wear out public interest, 
unearth embarrassing facts, and allow the Nazis a final chance to 
make propaganda. The legal difficulties also seemed daunting. It 
would be nightmarish to merge the American, British, and Soviet 
legal traditions. Nor was it clear that aggression - which was to be 
the main charge at Nuremberg and the focus of the American pros­
ecution - could be considered a war crime in any conventional 
sense. If the Nazi defense managed to score a few small victories, 
the trial might be denounced as "a farce." So Simon had a simpler 
solution: avoid the niceties of a trial and just shoot the Nazi 
leaders.1 
* Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University. A.B. 
1992, A.M. 1995, Ph.D. 1998, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. Great Britain Pub. Records Office (PRO), Kew, London: CAB 66165, W.P. (45) 281, 
Simon memorandum, "War Criminals: Annex B: The Argument for Su=ary Process 
against Hitler & Co.," May 3, 1945. 
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These arguments were to be quashed. Led by Henry Stimson, 
Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of War, the American government 
was determined to have sweeping trials for the Nazi war criminals. 
In the face of this, Britain decided not to push Simon's argument 
any further but to acquiesce with the wishes of its more powerful 
American ally with as much good grace as could be mustered.2 
Whether one agrees with them - and I don't - Simon's argu­
ments were not weak ones. But they are strange to hear neverthe­
less. Nuremberg is seen in retrospect as so unimpeachable, an act 
of such extraordinary restraint and justice, that it is disturbing to 
hear that it was fought with such pragmatic objections. When con­
sidering a war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and then 
another one for Rwanda, the United Nations did not air such de­
bates. To the contrary, there is a kind of orthodoxy in human rights 
circles that regards it as almost self-evident that war crimes deserve 
war crimes trials. So many of the arguments against war crimes tri­
als have been made in bad faith - by apologists for Serb or Croat 
nationalists and Hutu genocidaires, who do not really question le­
galistic methods but the need for punishment itself - that it is easy 
to forget that there are some reasonable arguments made in good 
faith against the trials. 
At a minimum, this protribunal orthodoxy is a post-Nuremberg 
artifact. Many scholars and diplomats have questioned whether 
war crimes and mass atrocities can properly be reduced to legal 
questions. While the Nuremberg trials were in session, Hannah 
Arendt wrote to Karl Jaspers, a German intellectual: 
Your definition of Nazi policy as a crime ("criminal guilt") strikes me 
as questionable. The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits 
of the law; and that is precisely what constitutes their monstrousness. 
For these crimes, no punishment is severe enough. It may well be 
essential to hang Goring, but it is totally inadequate. That is, this 
guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and 
all legal systems. That is the reason why the Nazis in Nuremberg are 
so smug.3 
Other thinkers, less commendably, have been more worried about 
the purity of American law than about punishing foreign war 
criminals. During Nuremberg, at the Supreme Court itself, Chief 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone was quietly indignant that Justice Robert 
Jackson was away serving as the American chief prosecutor at the 
Allied tribunal: 
So far as the Nuremberg trial is an attempt to justify the application 
of the power of the victor to the vanquished because the vanquished 
2. CAB 65/50, War Cabinet 57, W.M. (45) 57, May 3, 1945, 6 p.m., pp. 331-32. 
3. Letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers (Aug. 17, 1946), in HANNAH ARENDT AND 
KARL JASPERS: CORRESPONDENCE 1926-1969, at 51, 54 (Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner eds., 
Robert Kimber & Rita Kimber, trans. 1992). 
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made aggressive war . . .  I dislike extremely to see it dressed up with a 
false fa<;ade of legality . 
. . . It would not disturb me greatly . . . if that power were openly 
and frankly used to punish the German leaders for being a bad lot, 
but it disturbs me some to have it dressed up in the habiliments of the 
common law and the Constitutional safeguards to those charged with 
crime . . . .  
. . . Jackson is away conducting his high-grade lynching party in 
Nuremberg . . . .  I don't mind what he does to the Nazis, but I hate to 
see the pretense that he is running a court and proceeding according 
to common law. This is a little too sanctimonious a fraud to meet my 
old-fashioned ideas.4 
And in his book Profiles in Courage, John F. Kennedy dedicated a 
rather unconvincing chapter to praising Senator Robert Taft for ob­
jecting to Nuremberg as a betrayal of American legal standards.5 
There have also been more political objections. As World War I 
was drawing to an end, David Lloyd George, the British Prime 
Minister, tried to persuade the Imperial War Cabinet to approve 
war crimes trials for Kaiser Wilhelm II and other Germans. But 
Lloyd George found few takers at first. Jan Smuts, South Africa's 
Defense Minister, was not sure that Wilhelm II had committed any 
definite crime. W.M. Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia, was 
emphatic that Wilhelm II could not be put on trial si.nlply for start­
ing the war. Austen Chamberlain did not want to make a martyr of 
Wilhelm II by singling him out for trial. Winston Churchill himself 
had, in 1915, been enthusiastic about punishing U-boat crews, but 
in 1918, as Minister of Munitions, worried: 
It does seem to me that you might easily set out hopefully on the path 
of hanging the ex-Kaiser and have general public interest taken in it, 
but after a time you might find you were in a very great impasse, and 
the lawyers all over the world would begin to see that the indictment 
was not capable of being sustained. 6 
It was not only the British who had reservations. Cordell Hull, 
Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of State, and Henry Morgenthau Jr., 
Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury, both preferred summary exe­
cution to trials for Nazi war criminals. Henry Stimson, Roosevelt's 
Secretary of War, was the administration's foremost advocate both 
of war crimes trials and a generous settlement that would not hu­
miliate Germany. This generosity was presumably easier for 
Stimson because he, and the War Department, had never been no-
4. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HAru.AN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF TIIE LAW 715-16 {1956) 
(quoting letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Luther Ely Smith Jan. 2, 1946) (citations omitted). 
For a rebuttal, see, for instance, RICHARD A. PosNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JurusPRUDENCE 
228-39 (1990). 
5. See JoHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 261-77 (memorial ed. 1964). 
6. CAB 23/43, Imperial War Cabinet 37, Nov. 20, 1918, noon. 
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ticeably exercised about the extermination of the Jews. But more 
than any other member of Roosevelt's cabinet, Morgenthau tried to 
stop the Holocaust; and once the war was coming to a close, he was 
too angry to contemplate giving the Nazis the luxury of a trial.7 
Morgenthau's rage was certainly immoderate, but it was in the 
same vein as Arendt's critique of Nuremberg. Morgenthau and his 
staff at one point in 1944 were considering as many as 2,500 such 
executions.8 These plans for summary execution were enshrined in 
the Morgenthau Plan, a document calling for a tough peace that 
would pastoralize Germany lest it ever threaten Europe's peace 
again. At the Quebec Conference in 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill 
agreed to follow Morgenthau's lead. It was only after the 
Morgenthau Plan was leaked to the press that Roosevelt turned to 
Stimson's plans for war crimes trials. Morgenthau did not recant. 
He did not want the punishment of Nazis undercut by legal niceties. 
For Morgenthau, justice and law were not always the same thing. 
"I'm not a lawyer," Morgenthau said in June 1945, as the planning 
of Nuremberg dragged on. "Is there any reason they can't cut all of 
this monkey-business out and go right to the military tribunal?"9 
In retrospect, it is clear that Morgenthau and Hull had got the 
wrong end of the argument. We are right to reserve our highest 
praise for the people who made Nuremberg the triumph it was, like 
Jackson and Telford Taylor.10 But even the success of Nuremberg 
does not necessarily mean that trials will always work. The trials 
held after World War I, in Leipzig and in Constantinople, degener­
ated into disaster.11 The Tokyo tribunal was far less impressive 
than Nuremberg, and seems to have made less of a contribution to 
Japan's postwar development away from militarism.12 
Is law really the best way to address such atrocities? As Simon 
and others would point out, there are many reasons to be skeptical. 
7. See generally DAVID S. WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF TIIE JEws: AMErucA AND 
THE HOLOCAUST, 1941-1945 {1984) {discussing the Roosevelt administration's handling of 
the Holocaust). 
8. See 1 HENRY MoRGENTIIAU, JR., SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90nl: CoNo., 
MoRGENTIIAU DIARY (GERMANY) 486 (Co=. Print 1967). 
9. Id. at 1561. 
10. See TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEM· 
om {1992). By Jackson, see variously, ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE CASE AGAINST TIIE NAZI 
WAR CRJMINALS: OPENING STATEMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMErucA, AND 0TIIER 
DOCUMENTS {1946); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NORNBERG CASE {1947); REPORT OF 
ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFER· 
ENCE ON MILITARY TRJALS, LoNDoN, 1945 {1949); Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to 
WHITNEY R. HARrus, TYRANNY ON TRJAL: THE EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG xxix {1954). 
11. See JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY 
OF PUNISHING WAR CRJMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1982). 
12. See IAN BuRUMA, THE WAGES OF GmL"r: MEMoRJES OF WAR IN GERMANY AND 
JAPAN {1995); JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD 
WAR II, 443-84 {1999). 
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Law is an inflexible instrument, and the chaos of war and atrocity 
stubbornly resists shoehorning into neat legal categories. Legal 
goals may be at odds with those of politics. Or they may be at odds 
with a commonsensical understanding of substantive justice. Or the 
mix of politics with law may end up cheapening the law. The 
human rights orthodoxy - that trials are invariably helpful - may, 
in the end, be right; but it is not so self-evident or so uncomplicated 
that it should be beyond argument. Are war crimes trials really al­
ways the right way to go? 
II. 
Martha Minow13 is a quiet skeptic. The thrust of her thoughtful 
and humane book is that there is a broad spectrum of possible 
measures to try to cope with the aftermath of war or atrocity and 
that trials are only one possible notch along it. She asks: "Must all 
such societies pursue prosecutions in order to comply with interna­
tional human rights standards?" (p. 2). Quite unlike those lawyers 
who see justice as a matter of law or nothing, Minow is acutely 
aware of how little law can actually accomplish in an unstable polit­
ical climate. Minow upbraids the advocates of trials for overselling 
the virtues of their preferred solution, hyping trials as capable of 
grand tasks like deterring war crimes and rebuilding shattered soci­
eties (pp. 48-49). 
Minow has no such illusions. She admits that almost any re­
sponse - whether legalistic or not - to mass atrocity will be insuf­
ficient. She presents a long list of possible alternative responses, 
without placing too much hope in any of them: truth commissions, 
purges, reparations, apologies, memorials, naming names, and pub­
lic education (p. 23). She is not quite sure what will work, and is 
acutely aware of the difficult line that must be walked "between too 
much memory and too much forgetting" (p. 118). Trials are only 
one part of the story. 
But Minow is, of course, an expert on law, and it is for trials that 
she reserves her most stem language. She warns that the grandiose 
claims of international legalists not only go too far, they tend to 
breed cynicism when tribunals stumble under too heavy a load. As 
she puts it: 
I do not think it wise to claim that international and domestic prose­
cutions for war crimes and other horrors themselves create an inter­
national moral and legal order, prevent genocides, or forge the 
political transformation of previously oppressive regimes. Expansive 
claims may be tempting in order to convince international and na­
tional audiences to fund and support trial efforts, but exaggerated as-
13. Professor of Law, Harvard University 
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sertions are bound to yield critical and even hostile disappointment. 
[p. 49] 
In particular, Minow refuses to use deterrence as an argument for 
international war crimes trials. She admits that we do not know 
how to deter someone like Radovan KaradZic (p. 146). This stands 
in contradiction to the assertions of more orthodox human rights 
figures, like Madeleine Albright, Richard Goldstone, and David 
Scheffer. 
Minow, like Arendt during Nuremberg, is aware of the limita­
tions of law to deal with the worst horrors. These are acts that go 
beyond being criminal. Minow argues that mass violence requires 
"more severe responses than would any ordinary criminal conduct, 
even the murder of an individual. And yet, there is no punishment 
that could express the proper scale of outrage" (p. 121). As Minow 
admits, war crimes trials "depend for the most part upon symbolism 
rather than effectuation of the rule of law" (p. 122). There are sim­
ply too many perpetrators to be brought to justice, overwhelming 
any court system and threatening political chaos. Thus, in order to 
avoid cycles of violence, Minow would try to bring many lower­
level perpetrators back into society, presumably instead of simply 
purging them (p. 121). She knows that many of the guilty will es­
cape punishment. Human rights trials, as we know them, are not 
yet ready to deliver anything close to perfect justice. 
Yet this is not at all how their advocates advertise them. Trials 
are supposed to pin individual guilt upon individual criminals, so 
that no one can point to an entire nation as guilty. This argument 
comes up repeatedly, including in Minow's book (p. 123), but it has 
never been a particularly convincing one. Tribunals never punish 
anything remotely near the number of actual perpetrators, so the 
guilt or innocence of vast numbers of individual Germans or Serbs 
remains a mystery. In addition, some war criminals can never be 
charged, not because they are innocent, but because there is scant 
evidence of their crimes that would stand up in court. By purport­
ing that a war crimes tribunal has actually established individual 
responsibility in so many cases, some advocates of tribunals extend 
to huge numbers of unindicted war criminals an undeserved moral 
amnesty in addition to a de facto legal one. 
There are a few things not to like in this book. Minow's book 
has some jarring factual slips. She says that the U.N. set up the war 
crimes tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia in 1992; it was in fact in 1993.14 
She points out that DraZen Erdemovic, an executioner at 
Srebrenica in 1995, joined the Bosnian Army (p. 35), but neglects to 
mention that he was in the Bosnian Serb Army when he committed 
14. P. 34. AR.YEH NEIER, w AR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND TiiE 
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 111 (1998). 
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his murders15 - no trivial point, for uninformed readers may come 
away from her version thinking that the Bosnian Army was respon­
sible for the atrocities at Srebrenica: She writes that Stalin and 
Churchill both considered summary execution for the Nazis (p. 29); 
but she does not qualify this by pointing out that Stalin - true to 
form - had actually suggested killing 100,000 Germans, while 
Churchill furiously rejected Stalin's sweeping proposal and limited 
the British blacklist to 50 or 100 top Axis �eaders, insisting on trials 
for all the war crimirials not in the highest levels.16 
Minow's most impressive contribution is her refusal to get swept 
away. She is appropriately daunted by the difficulty of restoring 
shattered societies and tries to consider a broad range of policy 
tools that might help. And she is not so dazzled by the spectacle of 
war crimes trials that she loses her professional skepticism. 
III. 
If Martha Minow is a quiet skeptic, Mark Osiel17 is a true be­
liever with a twist. Not only ·does he believe that law can do great 
things even amidst political chaos, he has written an unsettling book 
on how to trim legalistic justice to the demands of theatricality. 
Unlike Minow, who reacts to the limitations of trials by casting her 
eye around the horizon for other alternatives, Osiel tries to recast 
the institution of the trial so that it will fit his sweeping purposes 
better. 
Osiel's primary concern is not "the criminal law's more tradi­
tional objectives" of deterrence and retribution (p. 2). As Minow 
notes, it is by no means clear that human rights trials do a good job 
of those two tasks. But Osiel has bigger fish to fry. Trials, he ar­
gues, "when effective as public spectacle, stimulate public discus­
sion in ways that foster the liberal virtues of toleration, moderation, 
and civil respect. Criminal trials must be conducted with this peda­
gogical purpose in mind" (p. 2). 
To be sure, Osiel thinks that storytelling is already inherent in 
trials in liberal courts (pp. 68-72), and that even "liberal show tri­
als" - to use his striking phrase - must be conducted within the 
limits of procedural fairness (p. 69). But the play is the thing. He 
wants spectacular criminal trials in which both the judges and law­
yers are explicitly concerned with what Osiel calls "the 'poetics' of 
15. See DAVID RoHDE, ENDGAME: THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA 128-29 
(1997). 
16. CAB 66/42, W.P. (43) 496, Churchill, "The Punishment of War Criminals," Nov. 9, 
1943, at 265-66; Bohlen Minutes, Tripartite Dinner Meeting, November 29, 1943, 8:30 p.m., 
Soviet Embassy, in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF TIIB UNITED STATES: THE CoNFERENCES AT 
CAIRO AND TEHRAN 1943, at 554 (1961). 
17. Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
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legal storytelling" (p. 3). The drama of the courtroom is to be 
turned into a "theater of ideas," focusing on "large questions of 
collective memory and even national identity . . . .  " (p. 3). This, 
Osiel argues, will contribute to a "social solidarity" (p. 3). These 
trials "should be unabashedly designed as monumental spectacles" 
(p. 3). Or, as he puts it at another point, what is required is "some 
measure of son et lumiere, smoke and mirrors, that is, some self­
conscious dramaturgy by prosecutors and judges" (p. 7). 
This is no small task, as Osiel admits. Having laid out his argu­
ment, he spends much of the rest of the book qualifying it, until in 
his conclusion he allows that "[i]t remains to be seen whether lib­
eral courts can entirely reconcile the traditional, delimited functions 
of criminal law with the dramaturgical demands of monumental di­
dactics" (p. 293). In rambling pages that could have used a good 
editor - there is far too much jargon and foggy prose - Osiel tries 
to answer some objections to his planned smoke and mirrors; 
mostly that a delusionary kind of history will be created. 
Osiel makes much of the Buenos Aires trials for members of the 
junta that waged Argentina's "dirty war." Among political scien­
tists at least, these trials, and the subsequent amnesties, have a 
more dubious reputation. As Samuel Huntington, perhaps the sin­
gle most distinguished figure in the study of comparative politics, 
writes, "the efforts to prosecute and punish in Argentina served 
neither justice nor democracy and instead produced a moral and 
political shambles."18 
Osiel points out that the witnesses were selected from many re­
gions and social classes, which, he argues, was meant to convey sub­
tly the message that the junta had targeted not just leftists and 
guerrillas but Argentines of all strata. This, he writes, "made a bet­
ter story" (p. 237). He talks of Argentine story-telling as a way of 
restoring civil society, and praises Argentina's President Raul Al­
fonsfn for, among other things, packaging the junta trials in a single 
hearing that could easily be televised (pp. 76-77). Unlike Minow, 
Osiel seems interested only in trials. Truth commissions, for in­
stance, according to the late Carlos Santiago Nino, the legal advisor 
18. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 221 (1991). As a matter of social science, Osiel - a sociologist as well 
as a law professor - stumbles by only looking at cases where there were trials. One needs to 
make comparisons among cases. If trials are supposed to be the cause of social solidarity, 
Osiel would need to look at cases of trials and cases of something other than trials. (In the 
jargon of political science, Osiel's explanatory variable does not vary.) See GARY KING ET 
AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
(1994). Minow does not use social scientific jargon - more credit to her - and she does not 
make Osiel's mistake: she examines trials but also alternatives like truth commissions and 
amnesties. Osiel also doesn't draw a systematic distinction between international and domes· 
tic trials, even though the political dynamics are in many respects quite different. Osiel ad· 
mits that his empirical work is anecdotal, and shies away from a rigorous social-scientific 
study that would systematically ask what trials really do. P. 239. 
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to Alfonsfn, and a hero of Osiel's, lack the requisite drama of a 
courtroom confrontation (p. 15). 
Osiel has great expectations from human rights trials, so long as 
the trials are not too dryly legalistic. In this, he is in many ways 
pitting himself against a more traditional view of war crimes trials. 
One of Hannah Arendt's less controversial criticisms of Israel's trial 
of Adolf Eichmann was a matter of due process (the court hadn't 
allowed defense witnesses), as was one of her points of praise (the 
court had given a more clear definition of crimes against humanity 
than at Nuremberg).19 She did want justice to be seen to be done, 
but her emphasis was on procedural fairness. She was withering 
about Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's attempts to use 
the trial as a showcase for Jewish suffering and for Zionism: 
There is no doubt from the very beginning that it is Judge Landau 
who sets the tone, and that he is doing his best, his very best, to pre­
vent this trial from becoming a show trial under the influence of the 
prosecutor's love of showmanship . . . .  And Ben-Gurion, rightly called 
the "architect of the state," remains the invisible stage manager of the 
proceedings. Not once does he attend a session; in the courtroom he 
speaks with the voice of Gideon Hausner, the Attorney General, who, 
representing the government, does his best, his very best, to obey his 
master. And if, fortunately, his best often turns out not to be good 
enough, the reason is that the trial is presided over by someone who 
serves Justice as faithfully as Mr. Hausner serves the State of Israel. 
Justice demands that the accused be prosecuted, defended, and 
judged, and that all the other questions of seemingly greater import 
- of "How could it happen?" and "Why did it happen?," of "Why 
the Jews?" and "Why the Germans?," of "What was the role of other 
nations?" and "What was the extent of co-responsibility on the side of 
the Allies?," of "How could the Jews through their own leaders coop­
erate in their own destruction?" and "Why did they go to their death 
like lambs to the slaughter?" - be left in abeyance. Justice insists on 
the importance of Adolf Eichmann . . . . On trial are his deeds, not 
the sufferings of the Jews, not the German people or mankind, not 
even anti-Semitism and racism.20 
Osiel takes just the opposite position. He is endorsing showman­
ship. As he writes in his conclusion: "To insist on punctilious judi­
cial adherence to any notion of legal formalism at such times is to 
guarantee the failure of courts to cultivate liberal memory when 
this objective is vital to successful democratization" (p. 298). 
19. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON TIIE BANALITY OF 
EVIL 251-52 {1963). 
20. Id. at 2-3. For a criticism of Arendt's controversial emphasis on Jewish passivity, see 
GERSHOM SCHOLEM, On Eichmann, in ON JEWS AND JUDAISM IN Crusrs: SELECfED EssAYS 
298 (Werner J. Dannhauser ed., 1976). For a less contentious account of the trial, see ToM 
SEGER, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND TIIE HOLOCAUST 323-66 (1994). 
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IV. 
The best aspect of Osiel's book is its reminder that justice must 
not only be done but also be seen to be done. This is a lesson that 
the two current U.N. tribunals have largely failed to grasp. 
Although the ex-Yugoslavia tribunal in The Hague is belatedly 
starting work on some kind of an outreach program, to date the 
tribunals have been spectacularly unsuccessful at showing their ef­
forts off to Bosnians and Rwandans. It is a long way from Sarajevo 
to The Hague, and from Kigali to Arusha; it is quite possible to be 
in Sarajevo and have no idea that a trial is going on in The Hague. 
This is particularly ironic because Sarajevo is a bustling hub of 
international humanitarian organizations, all of them highly visible. 
(The European Union took to painting Sarajevo trams in the colors 
of EU flags - navy blue with gold stars - to show off its contribu­
tion to the rebuilding of Bosnia; so did Saudi Arabia, so that trams 
would line up, one Euro blue and the next with a desert scene and 
images of Mecca.) The Hague tribunal is the only institution that is 
invisible. 
The Allies did not make the same mistake during Nuremberg. 
They went to considerable lengths to explain to the German public 
exactly what the Nazi leadership stood accused of: Allied forces 
handed out pamphlets, screened documentaries, and made broad­
casts on German radio.21 When Buchenwald was liberated, 
American military police marched a thousand residents of nearby 
Weimar through the camp to show them the nightmare reality 
there.22 Like the Allies, Osiel understands that such crucial trials 
must be part of the painful reeducation of a society. 
But how to accomplish such a massive task? What exactly 
would an Osiel-style trial look like, and why would this help a shat­
tered society? It is at this point that the book begins to unravel. 
Osiel places enormous faith in a clash of narratives, which he 
thinks will make a trial compelling and thereby help to knit a soci­
ety together. He argues that the "experience of disagreement itself, 
although often unpleasant and divisive in many ways, nonetheless 
creates a kind of joint understanding . . . .  " (p. 43). Osiel sees trials 
as a the first step in a dialogue when the other side is "initially un­
willing" (p. 46). "At the very least," he writes, 
through adversarial exchanges, when constrained by civility rules, we 
achieve a sense of lived experience that is mutual. With better luck, 
we gain some appreciation of how someone could, sincerely and in 
21. See RICHARD L. MERRITT, DEMOCRACY IMPOSED: U.S. OCCUPATION POLICY AND 
THE GERMAN PUBuc, 1945-1949, at 151 (1995). 
22. See Forced Tour of Buchenwald: Weimar Residents Shown Round, TIMES (LoNDON), 
Apr. 18, 1945, at 3. 
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good faith, come to think so differently from us about something so 
fundamental to us both. 
The experience of disagreement itself, although often unpleasant 
and divisive in many ways, nonetheless creates a kind of joint under­
standing: that we have both faced the issues dividing us, that we are 
united in caring deeply about them and about what the other thinks of 
them. The phenomenology of this interpersonal experience nowhere 
has adequately been captured in social or political theory. But who 
among us can deny having had it, and having found it not altogether 
unpleasant? [pp. 42-43] 
Victims of a war can deny it. Osiel's bookish formulation seems 
less than relevant to Bosnia and to the very societies that he is os­
tensibly writing about. The "experience of disagreement" is not at 
all the same thing as a war or civil conflict. Disagreeing in Congress 
over Medicare may not be "altogether unpleasant." Disagreeing in 
the Bosnian parliament over who is plotting a genocide - as the 
Bosnian Serb nationalist leader Radovan KaradZic and Bosnian 
President Alija Izetbegovic did shortly before Slobodan Milosevic's 
wars in Yugoslavia spread into Bosnia - is in fact a good deal 
worse than altogether unpleasant. And that was before the war. 
It is true that some of the defendants at the U.N. tribunal in The 
Hague, for instance, have come to have a less jaundiced view of 
U.N. justice in the course of their trials. They have noticed that 
they don't get tortured or starved, that the judges are not in cahoots 
with the prosecution, that they might get acquitted, and so on. This, 
however, does not seem likely to rise to the level of deliberation as 
theorists of deliberative democracy like Amy Gutmann or Seyla 
Benhabib would recognize it. 
In particular, Osiel is worried that human rights trials are some­
times too easy, that the conviction of the defendants will lack the 
requisite punch. In order for the clash of narratives to fit his bill, 
Osiel thinks, the prosecution and defense must .be allowed 
to widen the spatial and temporal frame of courtroom storytelling in 
ways that allow litigants to flesh out their competing interpretations 
of recent history, and to argue these before an attentive public. Only 
in this way can the debate within the courtroom be made to resonate 
with the public debate beyond the courtroom walls. Just as hard cases 
can make bad law, so too easy cases can make for poor drama (i.e., 
within the genre of the theatre of ideas, as a basis for discursive soli­
darity). [p. 296] 
For Osiel, trials will only be able to "weav[ e] their strictly legal con­
clusions into a plausible and relatively capacious narrative about 
the country's recent conflagration" if they "ensure that all antago­
nists feel they have received a fair hearing" (p. 298). 
All antagonists? This seems a bit much. Hermann Goring, in 
jail at Nuremberg, was convinced that his trial was purely a matter 
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of victor's justice, and that the trial was rigged. As he told the 
prison psychiatrist, 
[a]s far as the trial is concerned, it's just a cut-and-dried political af­
fair, and I'm prepared for the consequences. I have no doubt that the 
press will play a bigger part in the decision than the judges. - And 
I'm sure that the Russian and French judges, at least, already have 
their instructions. I can answer for anything I've done, and can't an­
swer for anything I haven't done. But the victors are the judges . . .  I 
know what's in store for me.23 
As it turned out, Goring held up well on the stand under question­
ing by Robert Jackson, the American prosecutor. But one would 
no more wish to make the success of a war crimes trial contingent 
on the opinion of Goring than one would wish to judge a murder 
trial a failure because the murderer didn't think he got to air his 
motivations to his heart's content. 
Is it really necessary that a Goring or a Karadzic not just get 
their day in court, but get to have it to their liking? There are times 
that call for dialogue, but the situations under discussion in Osiel's 
book tend to be those furthest removed from the ideals of dialogue. 
In practice, Osiel's suggestion of widening "the spatial and tempo­
ral frame of courtroom storytelling" would mean the unenlighten­
ing experience of, say, hearing a .  Serb concentration camp guard 
attempt to justify himself by talking about the Battle of Kosovo 
Polje in 1389, or about how the "Turks" (the Bosnian Serb national­
ist epithet of choice for Bosnia's largely secular Muslims, who are 
roughly as Turkish as Karadzic is) were plotting to make Serb 
women wear the veil. The situations are depressingly close to being 
zero-sum. 
Nor is it clear that a new consensus will only occur from dia­
logue with the perpetrators. It is clear that the radicals in Serbia 
and Croatia need to be weaned off their nationalist myths, but it is 
less clear that courtroom dialogues with the worst offenders will do 
the trick. The courtroom appearances of Goran Jelisic (who called 
himself "the Serb Adolf") and Tihomir Blaskic (the Bosnian Croat 
commander who led the sack of Bosnia's Lasva Valley) in The 
Hague are a matter of imposition, just as the Dayton Peace Accords 
only worked because they were imposed by NATO's military force 
and just as the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan was a mat­
ter of imposition. Jelisic did not just misunderstand the Bosnians; 
he hated the Bosnians. 
Much of the virtue of a human rights trial is precisely that it is 
not a dialogue. The criminal is stuck. He is not there because he 
wants to be, or to tell his story. He is not being improved by the 
experience. He is being judged, and then punished and humiliated. 
23. G.M. GILBERT, NUREMBERG DIARY 12-13 (1947). 
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This might be a source of some comfort to the victims. Watching 
such a spectacle in The Hague, what one appreciates about a war 
crimes trial is precisely that it no longer allows the war criminal to 
set his terms. During the war, the war criminal had the pleasure of 
the exercise of extraordinary power; now he is powerless. During 
the war, the war criminal could use his brute force to get attention 
for his paranoias and bigotries; now he is stuck in a forum where 
the law gives not a fig for these fictions, only for the stark documen­
tation of his cruelty. 
This is not to say that such imposition is an easy thing. But this, 
too, points to another problem in Osiel's argument. In most of the 
recent wave of democratizations, the ancien regime has negotiated 
itself out of power, usually insisting on amnesty as a precondition 
for its quiet exit. In a few cases, like Greece and Romania, the 
authoritarian regime suddenly collapsed, making trials or execu­
tions possible. But it is unusual to be able to impose one's political 
will as the Allies did after World War Il. 
The pattern is one of amnesty. When the dictators and thugs 
have made amnesty the price of their ouster, there is scant prospect 
of successful human rights trials. In Argentina, the case in the book 
with which Osiel has firsthand experience, Menem eventually de­
cided to issue amnesties. Osiel admits at one point that attempting 
to prosecute the junta, as Raul Alfonsfn unsuccessfully did, risked a 
military coup and the end of civilian ·rule (pp. 162-64) - a steep 
price to pay for a narrative. 
If we are in the narrative business, then the moral story of the 
democratization may come off as an inglorious one that buries the 
past. Osiel admits that there were rather ignominious political cal­
culations going on in MacArthur's decision to let Hirohito off with­
out prosecution, as well as in Alfonsfn's legal team, which had to 
mollify the military during the junta trials. But as Osiel puts it, if 
MacArthur's team had ever "honestly explained the reasons for 
their exclusion of the Emperor they would have made a mockery of 
the trial, discrediting it altogether" (p. 243). Alfonsfn, too, Osiel 
writes, would have made a mockery-of the Buenos Aires trials if he 
had publicly admitted that he was scrapping the trials because he 
was spooked by the unruly military. Osiel also admits that 
Alfonsfn's pragmatic motivations were clear to most everyone ob­
serving the Argentine scene (pp. 243-44). 
The problem is that such political amnesties underlie most of 
the recent democratizations. Osiel is recommending that we pursue 
narratives that, by his own account, will make "a mockery" of the 
trials among those people who grasp the underlying politics.24 It 
24. Osiel, in two confusing passages, argues that amnesties are also sometimes good for 
social solidarity. He writes: "rewriting the national story by such legal devices as pardons, 
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may be true, as Ernest Renan famously said, that "[g]etting its his­
tory wrong is part of being a nation."25 But one would like to think 
that there might be better ways to build a democratic citizenry. 
v. 
Minow, in her skepticism and modesty, is much more typical of 
liberal political thought on the question of postwar trials. In Legal­
ism, which remains the single most thought-provoking work on the 
moral and practical meaning of political trials, the political theorist 
Judith Shklar wrote: 
It is not that legalism and law, even in the narrowest juristic sense of 
the term, do not educate people and do not promote specific values 
and ideologies, but that their method is limited, and with it the scope 
of their influence upon the lives of individuals . . . .  On the political 
level it is thus the manipulative state that is the real rival of the legal­
istic state, and the policy of inducement, whether by propaganda or 
by terror and related pressures, competes with the policy of 
legalism.26 
These kinds of trials already operate under a huge burden. 
They must be seen as fair, even in conditions where the require­
ments of due process must be stretched and where there is massive 
public and political pressure. If the trial is international - as in the 
case of Nuremberg, Tokyo, and the two current U.N. tribunals -
then national court systems are being amalgamated on the fly, often 
in ways that are baffling to the participants. At the London Confer­
ence held to design the Nuremberg court, the American, British, 
and French delegations had to contend with a revenge-minded and 
Vishinsky-inspired Soviet delegation, and at Nuremberg they had to 
deal with Vishinsky himself. If the trial is national, then it will be 
hugely politicized, under pressures that might tear either society or 
the justice system apart. These trials tend to be stretched to the 
breaking point anyway. One might be forgiven for not rushing to 
add to the burden. 
In the aftermath of war and slaughter, it is entirely possible that 
nothing will work to bind up wounds except the passage of time, 
maybe measured in generations. Minow and Osiel are both looking 
for something better and quicker, which is a noble aspiration. But 
Minow's particular strength is her modesty in the face of such an 
enormous, miserable task. 
amnesties, and acts of clemency can sometimes greatly further the restoration of solidarity at 
such times.'' P. 132. He also notes that the Tokyo war crimes trials "united the Japanese 
populace in substantial rejection of the story they sought to tell.'' P. 206. 
25. Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce que c'est une nation? 7-8 (Conference faite en Sorbonne le 11 
mars 1882), in E.J. HoBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, 
MYIH, REALITY 12 (2d ed. 1992). 
26. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 120 (1964). 
